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Risk Measurement and Management
in a Crisis-Prone World
Abstract
The current subprime crisis has prompted us to look again into the nature of risk
at the tail of the distribution. In particular, we investigate the risk contribution of
an asset, which has infrequent but huge losses, to a portfolio using two risk measures,
namely Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). While ES is found to mea-
sure the tail risk contribution e¤ectively, VaR is consistent with intuition only if the
underlying return distribution is well behaved. To facilitate the use of ES, we present a
power function formula that can calculate accurately the critical values of the ES test
statistic. This in turn enables us to derive a size-based multiplication factor for risk
capital requirement.
Keywords: Value-at-Risk, expected shortfall, tail risk contribution, saddlepoint
technique, risk capital
JEL Classication: G11, G32
1 Introduction
The 1998 failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was said to be so severe that
it posed a serious threat to the worlds nancial system. Barely ten years have passed, the
scale of the current subprime crisis exceeds the LTCM debacle in every respect: the dollar
value lost, the number of banks a¤ected and its e¤ects on the wider economy. Although
the current problems originate in subprime mortgages whereas LTCM invested mainly in
xed income investments, both crises have one point in common: their return distributions
contain rare but extremely large losses.
Jorion (2000, p. 277) described LTCMs prots as bets on extreme events, like selling
options. This is supported by Agarwal and Naik (2004) who nd that a large number of
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hedge fund strategies exhibit payo¤s resembling a short position in a put option on the
market index. As the Black-Scholes formula predicts, an out-of-the-money written put yields
frequent small prots, but the loss incurred is large when it happens.1
Moreover, these extreme losses are often caused or exacerbated by high leverage. Though
the present crisis will probably cause risk managers in future to restrict the size of banks
nominal exposure, the strategy of using leverage on various nancial products has become
indispensable in an ever more competitive nancial world. Indeed, as Damodaran (2005)
points out, risk management is not just about reducing risk; it may involve increasing a
rms exposure to at least some types of risk that may give the rm advantages over its
competitors. A simple example is the long-short strategy which, according to an investment
model, buys winners and short sell losers. While the risk of leveraging such a portfolio (so
as to generate better than benchmark returns) is calculated to be acceptable, the margin
for errors in the model, liquidity, counter party and other risks has also been reduced by
leverage. In sum, it is essential to measure and manage infrequent risks of large losses due
to leverage in modern nance.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the sanctioned measure of risk and its widespread popularity has
raised the standard of risk management in the investment community. Both theoretical and
empirical research reveal that VaR yields many meaningful results.2 Nevertheless, Lo (2001)
lists several limitations of VaR as a measure of risk in hedge funds or investments with
an option-like nonlinear return structure. In this paper, we illustrate the use of Expected
Shortfall (ES), a risk measure that is complementary to VaR and tells investors the average
size of loss when a VaR is breached, to measure and manage aspects of the risk that underlie
1Indeed, rare-but-huge-loss payo¤ structure is not restricted to hedge funds. The worlds major banks also
share similar return patterns. For example, Berkowitz and OBrien (2002) examined six large multinational
banks over the period from January 1998 to March 2000, and found that they also incurred huge losses
during the 1998 crisis.
2For instance, Dowd (1999) shows that for a well-behavedfat-tailed distribution, e.g. a t-distribution
with ve degrees of freedom, the Sharpe rule for risk management decision-making remains valid if VaR
is calculated based on the appropriate t-distribution value. Another example is the recent work of
Bali and Cakici (2004), which nds that VaR, together with stock size and liquidity, can explain the cross-
sectional variation in expected returns.
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the extraordinary nancial crises mentioned earlier.
2 Risk Contribution
Given the complexity of modern nancial investments, Lo (2001) highlights the need to
capture the spectrum of risks involved. For example, a risk manager needs to consider the
dangers of diminishing correlations for an arbitrage fund, factor exposures to the market
index for a long-short strategy, optionality and inationary pressures for a xed-income
hedge fund, and so on. In this section, we use both VaR and ES to measure how each asset
or subportfolio contributes to the tail risk of a portfolio. Risk contribution analysis helps to
identify the sources of risk and is a step towards managing rare but extreme risks e¤ectively.
There are many further advantages in carrying out a risk contribution analysis using
VaR and ES. Firstly, correlation and linear models are the traditional tools used to attribute
sources of risk. However, Embrechts et al. (1999) point out that dependence measured by
linear correlation does not hold in a non-elliptical world, which is often characterized by
skewed and fat-tailed returns. Unlike linear correlation, a VaR or ES contribution focuses
on the dependence between the portfolio and its components at the tail of the distribution,
which is useful for managing extreme risks.
Secondly, Embrechts et al. (1999) introduce for measurement of nonlinear dependence
the concepts of comonotonicity and copula, which may be di¢ cult for general investors to
understand. VaR is a risk measure that condenses a usually complex distribution of returns
into a single number that can be easily understood by investors and risk managers as well
as regulators. As measures of how much an asset or subportfolio is contributing towards a
portfolios tail risk, both VaR and ES have the attraction of being simple enough to be easily
understood.
3
2.1 VaR and ES Contributions
VaR can be dened as the maximum loss on a portfolio over a specied period (typically 10
working days) with a given condence level, say 1   : Let R be the portfolio return with
distribution function F . If F is continuous,3
V aR(R) =  F 1():
Note that in this paper, a negative R means a loss whereas the risk measures, e.g. VaR
and ES, are represented by positive numbers. Hence, ES of the portfolio, dened as the
expected loss given that a loss exceeds VaR, can be written as
ES(R) = E[ Rj  R > V aR(R)]:
Where there is no ambiguity, the subscript  and argument R will be dropped for simplicity.
Former denitions provided by Tasche (2002) for attributing VaR and ES risk contribu-
tions to portfolio components are now stated as follows. Suppose there are d assets in the
portfolio. The portfolio return R can be written as
R =
dX
i=1
!iRi;
where Ri and !i are respectively the return and weight for the i-th asset. Under certain
smoothness assumptions on the joint distribution of (R1; :::; Rn), the contribution of !iRi to
the portfolios VaR is dened as
V aRCi = E [ Rij  R = V aR]  !i:
3For the sake of simplicity without a¤ecting the result of our research, all distributions considered in this
paper, unless stated otherwise, are absolutely continuous.
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Similarly, the ES-contribution of i-th asset to the portfolios ES is given by
ESCi = E [ Rij  R > V aR]  !i:
Note that in both cases the sum of risk contributions of each asset is equal to that of the
portfolio. That is,
Pd
i=1 V aRCi = V aR and
Pd
i=1ESCi = ES. If it is to be a satisfactory
guide to risk management, V aRCi or ESCi should provide some indication of how great is
the contribution of each asset to the tail risk of the portfolio as a whole. In doing so, it
should change monotonically as risky assets are added to a portfolio. Appendix A.1 at the
end of this paper provides details on the numerical methods used to approximate the risk
measures.
2.2 A Portfolio with Derivative Assets
We consider a portfolio made up of an investment of $1 divided between three assets: (1) the
S&P 500 stocks, (2) an index of corporate bonds, (3) an index of 7-10 year Treasury bonds,
plus (4) a written put on the S&P500 with varying degrees of moneyness, k =  5%; :::;+5%:4
The results reported here are based on a sample of daily data for the period 3 August 1998 to
27 May 2008, a total of 2470 observations. The characteristics of the dataset are summarised
by the statistics given in Table 1.
< Insert Table 1: Basic Statistics >
Thoughout the analysis, the dollar investments in the rst three assets remain xed:
$0.143 in S&P 500, $0.571 in corporate bonds and $0.286 in Treasury bonds.5 We focus here
4The moneyness, k; is dened as (strike - current price)/current price.
5Since experience shows that the standard deviation of stock returns is about four times as great as
that on corporate debt, these proportions mean that the value of the investment in stocks and bonds have
approximately equal volatility.
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on the impact on the portfolio as a whole when there are changes in the moneyness of the
written put. Table 2 provides the results based on daily returns.
2.2.1 The Case of No Leverage
First, consider the case of no leverage in Panel A where the value !4 of the short position
in the option remains at $0.107. As the written put is increasingly out-of-the-money, its
volatility diminishes. Though the portfolios skewness and kurtosis indicate a larger downside
risk, decreasing values of VaR, ES and worst loss reveal a net e¤ect of lower risk prole for
the portfolio as a whole. As the basic principle of nance dictates a lower return for lower
risk, the portfolios average daily return decreases from k = 0% onwards. Applying the
Sharpe rule of Dowd (1999) based on the ratio of average return to VaR, the portfolio is
optimized at k   1%.
2.2.2 The Case of Leverage
In highly e¢ cient nancial markets, opportunities for abnormal prot can often be eroded
due to competition, so that trading may not be feasible at the optimum, but only at lower
k, say  4%. Since the return is now far lower, leverage is used to pursue higher payo¤s.
Panel B shows the results when leverage is only applied to the option position, with value
of investment !4 increasing from $0.107 to $0.795.6 Several interesting observations can be
made. First, the portfolio volatility remains almost constant (with a very small decline from
k = 1% onwards). Second, conicting messages are signalled by VaR and ES. VaR peaks
at k =  3% and then decreases when the option is further out-of-the-money, indicating the
tail risk of portfolio decreases from that point onwards. By contrast, the increase in ES is
monotonic. That ES provides a more correct picture of extreme risk is supported by the
same monotonic increases of worst loss, size of negative skewness, and kurtosis.
These examples are consistent with the ndings of Basak and Shapiro (2001), who show
6In our simplied case, borrowing costs are ignored and leverage is represented by the increase in !4 from
$0.107 to $0.795.
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theoretically that, if investors optimized their portfolios with VaR constant, larger losses
would be incurred during adverse market downturns.
2.2.3 Risk contributions
VaR and ES risk contributions are summarised in the rest of Panel B in Table 2, and
graphically in Figure 1 and 2. For ease of comparison, each VaR (ES) contribution is divided
by the corresponding portfolio VaR (ES) so that the reported gures are in percentages that
sum to 100. In general, the message is that VaR behaves sensibly if the (possibly fat-tailed)
return distribution is relatively well behaved,7 and that ES proves a more reliable measure,
especially for highly nonlinear payo¤s.
In the rst place, when the put is deeper in-the-money (k  3%), there is little variation in
risk contributions as measured by either measure, but considerable disagreement between the
two risk measures with respect to the three risky assets, namely equity (asset 1), corporate
bonds (asset 2) and option (asset 4). Next, over near-the-money range (2%  k   2%),
when there is little nonlinearity in the options payo¤, both VaR and ES detect increasing risk
contributions from the larger investments in the short put position. There are corresponding
drops in risk contributions for corporate bonds and Treasury over this near-the-money range.
Finally, beyond k =  0:02 when the option is further out-of-the-money (and thus the
payo¤ structure is highly nonlinear), VaR counter-intuitively indicates a smaller risk for
higher leverage in the written put. Also, equally perverse is the corresponding sharp rise
in risk attributable to the corporate debt. Unlike VaR, the ES contribution of the option
increases monotonically with smaller k, reecting rising risk due to leverage and the nonlinear
payo¤ structure in the written put position. It is noteworthy that with larger leverage, the
option replaces the corporate bond as the main contributor of risk to the portfolio.
< Insert Table 2: Risk Contributions >
7Our results are consistent with the conclusions of Dowd (1999); see footnote 2.
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3 Nonlinearities
Nonlinear payo¤ structure is another reason given by Lo (2001) for not using VaR as a
risk measure in hedge funds. The risk contribution analysis given in the previous section
illustrates the case: VaR misleads investors into a false sense of security for deep out-of-
the-money puts with highly nonlinear payo¤s. The main reason for this lies in the fact
that VaR is a quantile measure which ignores sizes of losses beyond the VaR boundary;
Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) describes this as the tail risk of VaR. Lessons from the LTCM
and current subprime crises suggest that the nonlinear payo¤ structure could be modeled
as regime switches between normal and disaster states. Base on a regime-switching payo¤
structure of this kind, we provide analytical illustrations of why it is crucial for a risk measure
to take into account the sizes of losses beyond VaR.
Consider a portfolio whose return has a standard Gaussian distribution, , during nor-
mal times, but with a small probability p of a disaster bringing a huge loss L. Then the
distribution of the portfolio return can be written as
F (R) =
8><>: p+ (1  p)(R) if R   L;(1  p)(R) if R <  L:
Since disaster is rare, it is reasonable to assume that p < , the tail probability at which
VaR is calculated. As it is often the case that L > V aR; Appendix A.2 shows that the
portfolio VaR can be obtained as
V aR =   1 ((  p)=(1  p)) ;
and the associated portfolio ES is
8
ES =  1
"
pL+
(1  p) exp   (V aR)2 =2p
2
#
:
For market risk, Basle II set  = 0:01. If p = 0:005, V aR =  2:574: Note that in this case
VaR is independent of L, whereas ES increases with the size of extreme loss. For instance,
if leverage causes L to increase from 5 to 10, ES also increases from 3.945 to 6.445 whereas
VaR remains constant.
This provdes insights for the counterintuitive performance of VaR in the risk contribution
analysis. As the put becomes further out-of-the-money, nonlinearity in its return structure
increases until rare but large losses exist far in the tail of distribution.
4 Backtesting Rare Events
Backtesting plays a very important role in risk management. It enables risk managers to
nd out if the model at hand is appropriate and gives regulators a means to punish poor
(or reward good) risk management practices. Further, the process of backtesting leads risk
professionals to search for better models, which in turn allows them to understand better
the nature of risk, thereby raising the standard of risk management.
Backtesting VaR is a simple matter of counting exceptions and computing their fail-
ure rate. If the model is adequate, the rate of exceedance should be 5% or 1%, depend-
ing on the condence level set for VaR. This is the basis of the Basle, Kupiec (1995) and
Christo¤ersen (1998) tests. By contrast, since VaR exceptions are by denition rare in prac-
tice, there are too few observations to derive a meaningful condence interval to backtest
the ES estimate.8 This is one frequently-cited reason for preferring VaR to ES.
8If  = 1%, there are by denition only 2.5 breaches of VaR in 250 trading days, the sample size stipulated
by the Basle II over which backtesting is carried out.
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4.1 Power Function Formula
Recently, Wong (2008) showed that it is possible to use the saddlepoint technique to overcome
the problem in backtesting ES. Specically, a portfolio return R is distributed as standard
Gaussian, the p-value of sample ES statistics, calculated as average of VaR exceedances
(see Appendix A.1), can be approximated very accurately by the small sample asymptotic
technique.
Nevertheless, applying the saddlepoint backtest is a rather complicated exercise, since it
requires us to solve numerically for a saddle-point and then evaluate derivatives of higher-
order cumulants around the point. In this paper, we present a straightfoward way of deriving
critical values of the test distribution by evaluating the following power function:
(n) =  x  
xp
n

z +
a
(1 + 1000  n=b)c

(1)
where n is the number of exceptions in the sample, z is the standard normal -quantile
(the chosen condence level), and  x = 2:6652 and 2x = 0:09685 are respectively the
expectation and variance of ES0:01(R) under the null hypothesis. Consider the probability
calculated using the saddlepoint technique:
P
 
X <  (n)

= 
where X is the random sample mean of (minus) ES and the critical value of the power
function, (n), is obtained by numerical methods. Then minimizing the sum of squared
di¤erences between (n) and (n) for n = 1; :::; 200 makes it possible to solve for the
coe¢ cients a; b and c. The resulting values are given in the top half of Table 3.
< Insert Table 3: Power function formula >
The associated critical values for the 5% tail are given in the bottom half of the table. The
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gap between the analytical and simulated critical values is highest for only two exceedances,
but even in this case, the gap is only 0.0002. It is half as great for n = 5; 10; 20. Beyond this
level, the gap is zero up to the fourth decimal place. Indeed, when n approaches innity,
 pn 1x ((n) + x)  ! z:
4.2 Risk Capital
This analysis also has implications for the appropriate multiplication factor,M; to be used in
computing required risk capital. Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004) suggested a new approach
to implementing rewards and punishment by proposing to calculate M based on statistical
backtesting of ES. Their proposal is that the multiplication factor should be proportional
to the amount by which the ES under the null needs to be increased to make it no longer
signicantly smaller than the sample ES. However, since their functional delta approach to
backtesting may be inaccurate for small samples, we derive a saddlepoint version of the
multiplication factor formula:9
M = min

3max

1; 1 +
xp
nx

z   z   a
(1 + 1000n=b)c

; 4

; (2)
where if x is the sample mean of  ES, z = n 1x (x  x) : Comparing (2) with equa-
tion (31) in Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004), two di¤erences are apparent: rstly, the new
formulation depends on the number of exceptions, but not on sample size, and secondly,
the introduction of three additional parameters, a; b and c, makes this formula for M accu-
rate for any n > 0. Finally, we remark that for large n, equations (2) above and (31) in
Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004) converge to the same number.
9Proof of (2) is provided in Appendix A.3.
11
4.3 Responsive Risk Management
As pointed out in Wong (2008), the fact that this approach to backtesting ES is so reliable
even with only one or two exceptions in the data sample means that this risk measure can
be used to monitor the impact of extreme events rapidly, allowing management to react
promptly to crises.
< Insert Table 4: Responsive Risk Management >
Table 4 above tabulates the results of applying the power function formula in backtesting
and risk capital determination for the portfolio return, R, when moneyness k =  5%. As our
aim is to illustrate the use of equation (1) for responsive risk management, in-sample VaRs are
estimated based on assumptions that R is distributed as iid normal and iid skewed Student,
which is found by Giot and Laurent (2003) to model well the US stock index returns.
Panel A gives the backtest results for the entire sample. As in Wong (2008) and Kerkhof
and Melenberg (2004), the portfolio returns in the iid skewed Student case are transformed
into standard normal before they are backtested. The idea is that, if R is fatter-tailed than
the presumed distribution, the transformed data will also have fatter-tails than a standard
normal. It can be seen that normality fails to match the fat-tails in the portfolio returns,
both in terms of frequency and size of exceedances.
Following the above backtest results, Panel B calculates the rst ten associated critical
values and risk capital multiplication factors for the estimated VaRs, based on the standard
normal null hypothesis. For comparison, the multiplication factorm based on the Basle rules
is provided. When a loss rst exceeds VaR, the power function formula nds it signicant at
5% level and the associatedM adjusts to 3.19 accordingly. After less than a month, another
exceedance occurs, and the sample ES is found to be signicantly large at the 1% level so
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that M is now raised to 3.78. For all subsequent exceptions, ES backtest results remain
signicant at the 1% level and M is constant at the maximum value of 4. By contrast,
m based on the Basle rules, only starts to increase at the fth exception, and reaches its
maximum at the tenth exception.
4.4 VaR, ES and Stress Testing
In fairness, it has to be conceded that VaR was never intended to be the sole guide to
risk management. Being a quantile measure, a one-day V aR0:01(R) tells investors the worst
possible outcome in 99% of trading days. As for the question of howmuch worse the outcomes
could be beyond the VaR boundary, it is left to the role of stress testing.
However, there is no standard way to carry out stress testing and no standard set of
scenarios to consider. As Linsmeier and Pearson (2000) note, the process depends crucially
on the judgement and experience of the risk manager. In this sense, stress testing could
be regarded as more like an art than a science: a risk manager needs to nd a middle way
between the extremes of being too cautious on the one hand and too indi¤erent to risk on the
other. Excessive risk avoidance could mean no business ever being written because provision
has to be made for every conceivable extreme event; the opposite extreme might result in
no e¤ective risk reduction measures being taken after lots of pointless discussions about the
plausibility of particular scenarios.
These considerations are not meant to imply that stress testing is unhelpful. Rather, we
regard the analysis as a demonstration of the benet of being able to use ES backtesting
in a disciplined manner. In particular, since there is often no formal probability estimation
for stress scenarios, statistically backtesting the sizes of extreme losses provides information
which can be a useful complement to the usual VaR and stress testing analyses.
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5 Conclusions
VaR has a number of attractive features, the most obvious from a management point of view
being that it is easy to justify focussing on the maximum loss on a portfolio over a specied
period with a given condence level. Moreover, it is easy to backtest a VaR model, as no
distribution is assumed.
However, given the complexity and widespread use of leverage in modern nancial in-
vestments, it now becomes important to measure and manage the sizes of extreme losses in
a disciplined manner. In this regard, ES tells investors the expected value of the loss when
we observe an extreme outcome, and to that extent can be viewed as supplementing rather
than replacing VaR.
In this paper, we carry out a risk contribution analysis to demonstrate the importance
of identifying the source of extreme risks. Being a quantile measure, VaR could give a false
sense of security if there is excessive nonlinearity in the payo¤ structure. On the other hand,
ES measures the average size of losses beyond VaR and thus reects more realistically the
risk of rare but huge losses. We also show how the saddlepoint approximation method can
be used in a straightfoward manner to solve the problem commonly cited in the literature
of backtesting ES. Based on the saddlepoint approximation, a responsive risk management
practice involving dynamic adjusment of risk capital is illustrated.
A Appendix
A.1 Estimation of Risk Measures
Consider a random sample (R1; :::; RT ). Let R(i) be the order statistics such that R(i) 
R(i+1): Then VaR at condence level 1  is estimated using order statistics as in Dowd (2001).
Specically, if [T] = n denotes the integral part of T and r = T  n; then
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dV aR =  (1  r)R(n)   rR(n+1):
The associated ES estimator is given by
cES =   1
n
nX
i=1
R(i):
For the VaR-contribution, it is not easy to numerically estimate the conditional expec-
tation, E[ Rj   R = V aR]; as the condition  R = V aR hardly exists in practice. So we
consider a subset around V aR, (R([T "]); :::; R([T+"])) that conprise  " observations such
that as T tends to innity,  " approaches to innity but T 1 " diminishes to zero. Let Rj"
(1  j   ") denote such  " portfolio returns, and Rj"i (1  i  n; 1  j   ") refers to the
associated returns of i-th asset. Then VaR-contribution can be numerically estimated as
dV aRCi =  !i
 "
"X
j=1
Rj"i
.
For the ES-contribution of i-th asset, the numerical estimator is
dESCi =  !i

X
j=1
Rji;
where if Rj (1  j  ) refer to the  portfolio losses that are larger than the portfolio
VaR ( R  V aR(R)), Rji are the associated returns of the i-th asset.
For numerical analysis in Section 2,  " =   T , where  = 0:01 and T = 2470:
A.2 Nonlinearity
Since p <  and L > V aR(R), we can write the Stieltjes integral,
R  V aR
 1 dF (r) = , as
15
(1  p)
Z  V aR
 1
(r)dr = ;
from which the VaR formula follows. For ES,
ES(R) = E[ Rj  R > V aR]
=
  R  V aR 1 rdF (r)
P [ R > V aR]
=  1

pL+ (1  p)
Z  V aR
 1
r(r)dr

=  1

pL+
(1  p) exp [ V aR2=2]p
2

:
A.3 Derivation of (2)
Let Xi; i = 1; :::; n; refer to the n returns that breach VaR. The associated mean is denoted
by X with its realization by x: Under the null hypothesis, E[X] = x. Let M be such that
the ES under the null hypothesis should be increased so that it is no longer signicantly
more negative than the sample ES:
P (X   x < x Mx) = P (X   x <  (n)  x) = 
where  may be set at 0.05, the conventional signicance level used for hypothesis testing.
Substituting (n), using (1) and equating the arguments in the probability functions, we
have:
x Mx =
xp
n

z +
a
(1 + 1000n=b)c

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Substituting x = xn 1=2z + x and rearranging the terms, the following expression is ob-
tained
M = 1 +
xp
nx

z   z   a
(1 + 1000n=b)c

.
Since the multiplication factor, M , ranges from 3 to 4, we have:
M = min

3max

1; 1 +
xp
nx

z   z   a
(1 + 1000n=b)c

:
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Table 1. Basic statistics
Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 Asset 4
Corporate Short put
S&P 500 Bond Treasury k = 0:05 k = 0:00 k =  0:05
Mean* 0.0089 -0.0014 0.0025 0.0110 0.0380 0.0035
Stdev 1.158 0.282 0.402 1.069 0.622 0.144
Skew -0.007 1.530 -0.227 -0.179 -1.114 -5.078
Kurtosis 5.520 65.284 4.929 4.713 7.389 70.185
Min -7.044 -2.563 -2.080 -6.230 -4.815 -2.561
Q1 -0.622 -0.079 -0.226 -0.591 -0.245 -0.001
Median 0.044 0.000 0.010 0.051 0.117 0.003
Q3 0.619 0.088 0.240 0.615 0.406 0.037
Max 5.574 5.199 2.048 4.010 2.142 0.684
*Note that the corporate bond and treasury returns are based on price indices
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Table 2. Risk contribution
Panel A: No leverage; !4 = 0.107
k 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05
V aR 0.856 0.854 0.849 0.853 0.847 0.836 0.830 0.793 0.737 0.656 0.573
ES 1.157 1.154 1.150 1.146 1.140 1.130 1.112 1.079 1.028 0.956 0.858
Mean (%) 0.236 0.317 0.426 0.559 0.687 0.762 0.744 0.642 0.503 0.365 0.244
Stdev 0.331 0.330 0.328 0.324 0.318 0.309 0.295 0.277 0.253 0.226 0.196
Skew 0.221 0.195 0.159 0.110 0.047 -0.032 -0.127 -0.242 -0.386 -0.571 -0.804
Kurtosis 11.999 11.940 11.909 11.952 12.141 12.578 13.374 14.635 16.489 19.132 22.807
Min -2.384 -2.382 -2.384 -2.391 -2.408 -2.434 -2.464 -2.484 -2.478 -2.427 -2.315
Panel B: Leverage; increasing !4
!4 0.107 0.112 0.119 0.132 0.152 0.184 0.233 0.307 0.414 0.570 0.795
V aR 0.856 0.857 0.859 0.872 0.882 0.893 0.925 0.936 0.941 0.931 0.930
ES 1.157 1.159 1.163 1.171 1.186 1.208 1.239 1.274 1.314 1.355 1.392
Mean (%) 0.236 0.318 0.431 0.571 0.715 0.815 0.829 0.758 0.643 0.517 0.396
Stdev 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.330 0.329 0.327 0.324 0.321 0.317
Skew 0.221 0.195 0.159 0.110 0.047 -0.032 -0.127 -0.242 -0.386 -0.571 -0.804
Kurtosis 11.999 11.940 11.909 11.952 12.141 12.578 13.374 14.635 16.489 19.132 22.807
Min -2.384 -2.393 -2.410 -2.445 -2.505 -2.602 -2.744 -2.932 -3.165 -3.441 -3.755
V aRC1 0.407 0.406 0.405 0.385 0.409 0.428 0.417 0.425 0.354 0.305 0.278
V aRC2 0.270 0.269 0.268 0.290 0.252 0.237 0.262 0.250 0.322 0.424 0.492
V aRC3 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.020 -0.025 -0.052 -0.081 -0.022 -0.018 -0.018
V aRC4 0.284 0.286 0.289 0.289 0.320 0.360 0.373 0.406 0.346 0.289 0.248
ESC1 0.322 0.322 0.321 0.327 0.335 0.340 0.338 0.336 0.333 0.323 0.312
ESC2 0.466 0.465 0.463 0.456 0.437 0.425 0.407 0.393 0.359 0.348 0.338
ESC3 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.023 -0.030 -0.047 -0.051 -0.061 -0.056 -0.054 -0.051
ESC4 0.221 0.223 0.226 0.240 0.258 0.283 0.306 0.332 0.363 0.383 0.401
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Table 3. Power function formula
Panel A: Coe¢ cients of power function
 level
0.005 0.01 0.025 0.05
z -2.5758 -2.3263 -1.9600 -1.6449
a -15.7925 -14.4907 -13.1094 -12.6446
b 6.2965 4.6150 2.2280 0.6994
c 0.4817 0.4832 0.4828 0.4758
 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
Panel B: Examples of critical values ( = 0:05)
n (n) (n)
1 -3.3012 -3.3012
2 -3.0901 -3.0903
5 -2.9200 -2.9199
10 -2.8403 -2.8402
20 -2.7864 -2.7863
50 -2.7403 -2.7403
100 -2.7178 -2.7178
200 -2.7021 -2.7021
 is to the maximum absolute error between (n) and (n):
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Table 4. Responsive risk management
Panel A: Backtesting
Null hypothesis n a p cES 0:05(n) 0:01(n)
Normal 48 0.0194 0.000 3.492 2.742 2.777
Skewed Student 27 0.0109 0.647 2.668 2.769 2.818
Panel B: Multiplication factor
Date n m M cES 0:05(n) 0:01(n)
19980804 1 3.00 3.19 3.472 3.301 3.724
19980827 2 3.00 3.78 3.783 3.090 3.347
19980828 3 3.00 4.00 4.019 3.003 3.197
19980831 4 3.00 4.00 5.975 2.953 3.113
19981007 5 3.40 4.00 5.269 2.920 3.058
19981008 6 3.50 4.00 4.983 2.896 3.018
19990212 7 3.65 4.00 4.622 2.877 2.988
19990323 8 3.75 4.00 4.342 2.862 2.965
19990514 9 3.85 4.00 4.156 2.850 2.945
19990527 10 4.00 4.00 3.997 2.840 2.929
a and p in Panel A are failure rate and p-value respectively.
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Figure 1: VaR contribution when leverage is applied
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Figure 2: ES contribution when leverage is applied
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